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The Non-Human as Such: On Men, Animals, and 
Barbers 
_Abstract 
The article investigates a dialectic that, through the work of negation, paradoxically 
brings the non-human as ‘anything but human’ back to the human. It shows how and 
why, throughout the criticism of all forms of anthropocentrism, the human being still 
occupies a central place in the very discourse that negates him. His principal position 
only changed its value from а positive to а negative one. If there is something in com-
mon among all possible non-human things in the world, it is their negative determi-
nation with regards to the human. While being actively denied, ‘human’ thus remains 
a main constitutive element of their identity, a kind of general equivalent, whose on-
tological status is highly problematic and therefore particularly interesting.  
 
What, if anything, is a non-human? A superficial reply seems to be on the surface: a 
non-human is anything other than human. It can be an elephant, a diamond, a wasp, a 
robot, a flower, a cloud, a cyborg, a stone, a computer program, a star, a work of art, a 
zombie — there is an endless list of worldly things that are different from the human 
being. They return from a long exile of ontological and epistemological subordination 
to the human, who, by historically expanding his habitat, appointed himself the hub of 
the universe. They come out of the shadow of the human and turn their back on him in 
order to face their own, non-human existence as autonomous objects, as alternative 
subjects, as irreducible singularities, as material agencies, as intensities, as bodies, as 
media, as forms of life.  
The heterogeneous multiplicity of non-humans provides abundant resources and po-
tentials for the study of culture, but, above all, it haunts the entire domain of the hu-
manities. In their increasingly developing receptivity to significant otherness, which 
constitutes and shapes the limits of the human, the humanities are getting pregnant with 
the non-human. Various attempts to imagine or to theorize a world before, after, apart 
from, or simply without humans, a world outside the anthropocentric horizon endowing 
with a privilege of universality one particular form of being, are characteristic of a great 
deal of contemporary research.  
An aggressive, greedy species that exploits nature, abuses other animals, and slowly 
but surely destroys the planet, and whose ways of cognition, communication, reason-
ing, and moralizing are designed to perpetuate violence, receives — and from itself at 
that — something like a vote of no confidence. This motion aims at the very heart of a 
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long humanist tradition, which is gradually displaying its dark, seamy side. The human 
being manages to convince himself, at least theoretically, that that which is different 
from him and which was, for this very reason, continuously neglected, repressed, 
abused, or underestimated by him, deserves to be rehabilitated or redeemed. And, in-
deed, ultimately, all things are different from the human being except the human being 
himself. An entire world seems to turn back on him, unwilling to remain his posses-
sions. Conceptualizing the non-human in this post-humanist vein leaves an impression 
that there is at last, on the one hand, an infinite multiplicity of the world or worlds that 
are not human, and, on the other, a human being standing apart, disgraced, all alone.  
However, upon a closer view, it becomes clear that in this picture, with all due dis-
respect towards him, that very same human being still occupies a central place. His 
principal position only changed its value from а positive to а negative one. Everything 
is centered on him as before, but from centripetal, the general direction of the non-
human turned into centrifugal. If there is something in common among all possible 
non-human things in the world, it is their negative determination with regards to the 
human. While being actively denied, human thus remains a main constitutive element 
of their identity, a kind of general equivalent; elephants, flowers, clouds, cyborgs, 
stones, stars, zombies, and others, all unite against the backdrop of the one that they 
are not. Nothing less than a universal non-humanity is born by this tectonic shift, but it 
is doomed to be, so to say, negatively anthropocentric, constituted by the torsion of the 
‘non’ around the human. He is not a part of this multiplicity, he is excluded from it, but 
precisely from this position of the excluded, he keeps providing it with some con-
sistency and meaning.  
One of the main driving forces of the re/turn of the non-human is thus negation, in 
both the Hegelian and the Freudian sense. Trying to extend Hegelian logic to the hu-
man/non-human relation,1 one can consider the ‘non’ as that which mediates between 
the two opposites, each of which, as Hegel says,  
therefore, simply is, first, to the extent that the other is; it is what it is by virtue of 
the other, by virtue of its own non-being; it is only positedness. Second, it is to the 
extent that the other is not; it is what it is by virtue of the non-being of the other; 
it is reflection into itself.2 
Furthermore, the ‘non’ not only indicates that the one is the other for the other, and that 
they negate, constitute, define, and affect each other, but also that these two terms are 
neither symmetrical nor stable: the ‘non’ is what transforms their mere opposition into 
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a productive contradiction. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, a non-human explic-
itly contains and presupposes ‘human’: the ‘non’ here is needed to go beyond meta-
physical binaries, towards a complex process of exclusion, alienation, and self-altera-
tion, or becoming other, which is, after all, according to Hegel, the only way to arrive 
at oneself, to come back to being through one’s own non-being. Thus, seen through the 
lenses of Hegelian dialectics, the non-human turn is definitely a necessarily part of the 
human’s self-determination.  
Slavoj Žižek repeatedly emphasizes the extreme importance and wide applicability 
of the notion of determinations of opposition, introduced by Hegel in the cited chapter 
from The Science of Logic. Žižek calls them “oppositional determination[s]”3 and fo-
cuses on the radical asymmetry of the terms involved. He points, for instance, to a 
strange overlap, “when the universal, common ground of the two opposites ‘encounters 
itself’ in its oppositional determination, that is, in one of the terms of the opposition.”4 
Each one being the other for the other, the two terms are now not simply opposed, but 
contradict each other as a universal claim or idea and a particular element, which is 
taken as its genuine agent. One of the basic examples will be quite relevant here, since 
it has to do with the classical philosophical opposition between human and animal.  
In the chapter “The Animal that I Am” of his Less than Nothing, Žižek develops his 
original critical stance on Derrida’s deconstruction of the human/animal distinction,5 
developed mainly in his late works on animality, especially in his ten-hour seminar The 
Animal That Therefore I Am,6 where Derrida undermines traditional the philosophical 
idea that man differs from other animals according to a certain generalized criterion, 
be it language, thought, knowledge, awareness of death, etc. Philosophers were always 
concerned about such criteria — in this regard, Derrida even claims that “one under-
stands a philosopher only by heeding closely what he means to demonstrate, and in 
reality fails to demonstrate, concerning the limit between human and animal.”7 
For Derrida, however, the question is not what the true and ultimate criterion of 
differentiation is, so that already existing ones turn invalid again and again when evi-
dence appears that certain animals fall under the same parameters. For instance, a phi-
losopher claims that animals do not speak, and only humans do, and a child replies to 
this generalization by pointing to a parrot, or — a paradigmatic example — to Plato’s 
famous definition: “Man is a biped without feathers,” to which Diogenes replies by 
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taking a plucked chicken and saying: “Look, Plato’s man!” Such a move is often trig-
gered by science, which always brings about some important updates on animals’ in-
telligence, language, complicated ways of communication, developed models of social 
behavior, creativity, etc. Discoveries of this kind prompt a search for yet another crite-
rion for the definition of the human being (as the previous ones were compromised), 
and this only shifts the border separating him from the rest of the animal kingdom.  
The question is how this very differentiation, where there are humans, on the one 
hand, and all other animals, on the other, is ever possible. Deconstruction shows that 
this binary is absolutely illegitimate and based on a massive repression of diversity of 
the living species for the sake of just one of them. A violent merging of various multiple 
animals into an abstract homogeneous unit of ‘the animal’ shadows arbitrariness, tyr-
anny of anthropocentric categories, and the limits imposed by them. “The limit of the 
animal” is a threshold beyond which no animal allegedly can step, “where the animal 
stops, the limit at which it comes to a halt, must stop or be arrested.”8 Derrida’s aim is, 
however, “not in effacing the limit, but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, 
thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line precisely by making it increase 
and multiple.”9 
It may be true that Derrida makes hay of philosophers’ persistent and failed attempts 
to separate themselves as humans from some generalized animality, and yet, as Žižek 
claims in response to this very powerful line of argumentation, there is a way for a 
notorious human-animal distinction to be justified. A passage from Marx, which Žižek 
quotes in this chapter, provides a great illustration for a better comprehension of the 
core of the problem. In the first edition of the first volume of Capital, Marx explains 
the logic of the general equivalent, using the following metaphor:  
It is as if, alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other actual ani-
mals, which form when grouped together the various kinds, species, subspecies, 
families, etc. of the animal kingdom, there existed in addition the animal, the in-
dividual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom.10 
Of course, one would say, Derrida was right, such an animal as such does not exist; it 
is just an abstract idea. However, this is a real abstraction, of which money is, of course, 
a perfect case: a universal equivalent is abstract, and yet it is real.11 Yes, an exchange 
value doesn’t initially belong to a thing, it just attaches to it, but it equally attaches to 
all other things — that’s why it is called a universal equivalent. Since it attaches to all 
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things of the world, it is now something which they have in common: they are deter-
mined by it. By a value-form, things are transformed into commodities, and hence what 
was conceived as a mere abstraction and a kind of unnecessary external supplement 
becomes the very intrinsic essence of these things and constitutes the reality of capital, 
which consists not of things, but of commodities.  
If we read the Marxian metaphor literally, the same logic applies to animality: a 
solitary animal as such, running alongside a heterogeneous pack of all really-existing 
animals, but at the same time attached to every single individual in this pack, is a real 
abstraction that paradoxically unites such singular entities as tigers and rabbits and 
transforms them into ‘animals.’ He is a universal equivalent for the tiger and the rabbit; 
they all have this animal as their representative; he incarnates them, and they, too, now 
keep him, so to say, somewhere deep inside of them as their very essence. The problem 
starts with the question of how to locate the animal as such — does he himself belong 
to the multiplicity of animals which he incarnates? Does he ‘encounter himself’ in one 
particular species and is, therefore, a species of himself?  
Thus real abstraction is hampered not only by the problem of oppositional determi-
nation, but also by Russell’s famous paradox of a set of all sets that do not include 
themselves — this ultimate set includes itself only if it does not, and does not only if it 
does.12 It is also known as the barber paradox (although Russell himself denied that this 
popular version was his own): the barber is a man in town who shaves all those, and 
only those, men in town who do not shave themselves; but who then shaves the barber? 
Since the claim applies to the barber himself, the answer — but not the solution — is 
that either he shaves himself only if he doesn’t, or he doesn’t only if he does. A real 
abstraction falls in the same trap. As а value-form, it commodifies things, but at the 
same time it is itself a kind of paradoxical non-commodified commodity, a commodity 
without body.13 As an animal as such, it animalizes tigers and rabbits, but cannot quite 
‘animalize’ itself (again, it runs without a proper animal body). There is something in 
common between commodifying things, animalizing tigers, and shaving men: someone 
or something should do this job, but if they do, they cannot really exist. 
One of the frequent quasi-solutions of the barber paradox has the form of a joke. 
From the standard paradox, it omits one important detail, namely the gender of the 
barber, who now claims in the first person: I shave all those, and only those, men in 
town who do not shave themselves. It is clear that the barber shaves men, but it is not 
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clear whether this barber is a man or a woman. If we want to escape a paradox entirely, 
the barber should be a woman, since the claim applies only to ‘men in town.’ Gender 
rearrangement changes everything — since a man is fired, and a woman is hired by the 
barber’s shop, the town is rid of the burden of paradox.  
Although this is a joke that seemingly has nothing to do with the initial paradox of 
a male barber, there is, as in every joke, a grain of truth in it. The truth is that a sudden 
intervention of the other breaks the continuity and immediacy of a given set. A logical 
paradox takes place within a closed homogeneous structure, a key element of which 
cannot sustain an unavoidable encounter with itself. Paradox is pre-dialectical: it deals 
with an identity that does not yet know difference, doesn’t know other, and is caught 
in a deadlock of pure positivity. It is the town of bearded men who are thrown upon 
their own devices and whose innocent attempts to shave each other are doomed to a 
logical failure. Bearded men are captured in a closed-circuit of self-referentiality until 
a woman enters into the town — and shaves everyone.  
A logical paradox doesn’t have a solution in the desired condition; it can only be 
resolved when the condition changes, the gates of the town open, and a stranger crosses 
its border. Or, better to say, her intervention doesn’t resolve, but dissolves a paradox 
for the sake of something else. The female barber doesn’t shave herself, but, since she 
is beardless, it’s not a problem any longer. In turn, she introduces such a new thing as 
sexual difference, and thus brings even bigger trouble to town. Instead of a logical par-
adox, the set of bearded men have to confront a dialectical contradiction, with which 
the very act of shaving becomes something of great importance.  
Let me now draw a parallel between an animal as such, who cannot find its proper 
place among actually-existing tigers and rabbits, and an unfortunate barber, who does 
not know what to do with his beard, while shaving all the rest in the town of men. Like 
this bearded barber, the animal as such would have stayed in the trap of a paradox of 
being a member of himself, on condition that there were only animals on earth. Coming 
back to Derrida and Žižek, one can indicate two respective vectors of dealing with this 
difficulty.  
As already mentioned, Derrida doesn’t aim to efface the limit between animal and 
man, but he wants to multiply and complicate differences, to re-establish heterogeneity, 
and to get rid of such an absurd figure as the animal as such, which makes the world of 
living beings break up into two unequal parts by reducing all tigers and rabbits to the 
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same level of ‘animals’ altogether, as opposed to a human being, the human being is 
dwelling beyond their limit. Philosophers, such as Decartes, think that animals cannot 
‘reply,’ and this is their limit,14 but what if animals replied? — asks Derrida.15 Assum-
ing that they can reply, within a deconstructionist framework, neither results in yet 
another shifting of the limit (if a capacity to reply doesn’t work, one can always intro-
duce a new criterion of differentiation), nor does it makes animals part of a human 
world (as endowed with human capacities and therefore deserving compassion, respect, 
etc.). These perspectives are just two angles of pure and simple humanist deadlock. 
Instead, Derridean animals would probably anarchistically reply that they do not 
want to be animalized (named, classified, counted, etc.), that is, deprived of their irre-
ducible singularity and merged under the heading of the animal as such, who, although 
it hardly exists, pretends to be their very essence. Similarly, all the men in town could 
reply that they simply do not want to be shaved; they would prefer to stay bearded, to 
keep the diversity of their beards against the violent uniformity of clean-shavenness. 
The bearded men would probably even ask the barber, who treated them all alike, to 
leave the town and to leave them alone. Thus they would express their collective refusal 
of a certain kind of symbolic castration (which, in human societies, serves as a main 
step to manhood).  
Žižek’s proposal is totally different. He apparently gets down to playing devil’s ad-
vocate in order to challenge what he calls “the common sense of deconstruction,” which 
in this case is presented by Derrida’s intention “to denounce the all‐encompassing cat-
egory of ‘the animal’.”16 The necessary evil contained in this category displays a re-
duction to a “minimal difference” and the introduction of a “minimal distance.”17 As 
he explains: 
To put it in Hegelese, it is not only that, say, the totalization effected under the 
heading ‘the animal’ involves the violent obliteration of a complex multiplicity; it 
is also that the violent reduction of such a multiplicity to a minimal difference is 
the moment of truth. That is to say, the multiplicity of animal forms is to be con-
ceived as a series of attempts to resolve some basic antagonism or tension which 
defines animality as such, a tension which can only be formulated from a minimal 
distance, once humans are involved.18 
Although this doesn’t sound like a joke, the solution proposed by Žižek for the animal 
as such and its pack is, in a way, analogous to the one with a female barber. It is as if 
an animal as such were itself not really an animal among animals, but a human being. 
In this vein, Žižek even refers to the early Marx’s definition of a Gattungswesen,19 a 
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species‐being, according to which man is an indeterminate creature who doesn’t really 
belong to this or that species, and precisely due to this luck of any specific determina-
tion, becomes both a universal producer and a producer of the universal.  
An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the 
species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with 
the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent 
standard to the object,20 
says Marx in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Almost like a woman in 
the town of bearded men, this strange being intrudes into an animal kingdom and in-
troduces a minimal difference, which after all creates such a mess that tigers and rabbits 
look at this creature in perplexity. This is the end of a paradox and the beginning of an 
antagonism. 
It is the human being who now animalizes animals, that is, produces ‘animals’ out 
of tigers and rabbits according to his standards, and who is to be blamed for a violent 
reduction, shaving, castration, slaughtering, torturing, and extermination of various 
kinds of really-existing living beings. And this is, following Žižek’s argument, pre-
cisely what animality is. The animal as such is not the animal other of the human, he is 
the animal other of the animal. He projects and imposes animality on really-existing 
tigers and rabbits. We see them and recognize them as animals (we put them all in one 
and the same zoo), but what do they see while looking at us? — The animal as such.  
Žižek gives a striking example of a cat “after it had been subjected to some lab 
experiment in a centrifuge, its bones half broken, its skin half hairless, its eyes looking 
helplessly into the camera,”21 and suggests that what the cat’s gaze expresses “is per-
haps the cat’s horror at having encountered The Animal, namely ourselves, humans: 
what the cat sees is us in all our monstrosity, and what we see in its tortured gaze is our 
own monstrosity.”22 Commenting on this, Žižek applies the Lacanian notion of the 
symbolic to what I already characterized as a real abstraction: 
[T]he big Other (the symbolic order) is already here for the poor cat: like the pris-
oner in Kafka’s penal colony, the cat suffered the material consequences of being 
caught in the symbolic gridlock. It effectively suffered the consequences of being 
named, included in the symbolic network.23 
Yes, the animal as such might hardly exist, but it really affects existents, leaves material 
traces on their bodies, and reflects in their eyes. 
As regards the encounter between an animal gaze and man’s own animality, I must 
refer to another example which is very significant for the history of psychoanalysis, 
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namely, a famous Freudian wolf-man case. Here, the animal gaze becomes the turning 
point of the whole story. After a period of quite unsuccessful due to a strong resistance, 
analytic treatment (started in 1910), Sergey Pankejeff, a Russian patient of Freud, sud-
denly recounted a dream which he allegedly had when he was a little child: 
I dreamed that it is night and I am lying in my bed (the foot of my bed was under 
the window, and outside the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I know 
that it was winter in my dream, and night-time). Suddenly the window opens of 
its own accord, and, terrified, I see that there are a number of white wolves sitting 
in the big walnut tree outside the window. There were six or seven of them. The 
wolves were white all over and looked more like foxes or sheepdogs because they 
had tails like foxes and their ears were pricked up like dogs watching something. 
Obviously fearful that the wolves were going to gobble me up I screamed and 
woke up.24 
One of the most important details of the dream is that the white wolves sat motionlessly 
on the tree, starring fixedly at the boy. Freud considerably advanced in his investigation 
of this case when he applied a notion of inversion (when something in the dream trans-
forms into its opposite in order to stay disguised). First of all, together with his patient, 
he suggested that it was not the window of his bedroom, but his own eyes which were 
suddenly opened (as if the window were just one of the layers of his eyes, and the 
bedroom an extension of the interior of his head). Then followed an assumption that 
the gaze of the wolves was actually the patient’s own gaze: it was the boy himself who 
was staring with the fearsome eyes of wolves at something terrible which now occupied 
his own place: “The attentive gaze, which in the dream he attributes to the wolves, is 
actually to be ascribed to him.”25 Finally, the stillness of the wolves indicated an in-
tense, violent motion there on the side of the seen.26 What does the boy sees with the 
wolves’ eyes? His parents having sexual intercourse, Freud replies, thus coming up 
with his hypothesis of a primal scene. 
The idea that that the wolves’ “fascinated gaze is the [dreaming] subject himself”27 
was strongly emphasized by Lacan: “The subject passes beyond this glass in which he 
always sees, entangled, his own image.”28 According to Lacan, this encounter of the 
subject with himself, eyes to eyes, is a privileged experience of an ultimate real, which 
only a dream can provide. The fact that the subject encounters itself implies that it is 
not one, that it is split, and there are at least two parts of it which meet halfway. One 
would ask, however, what is the place of a true subject? Is it within or beyond the glass 
(or the window)? Who or what comes first: a boy, that is, an integral unity of a human 
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being which produces a fantasy, or white wolves as some primordial animal multiplic-
ity revealed in the dream? In Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, what comes first is the 
split itself. This impossible relation is established by “an absolute other,” or “an essen-
tial alien, who is neither the supplement, nor the complement of the fellow being, who 
is the very image of dislocation, of the essential tearing apart of the subject.”29 
In a way, the task of psychoanalysis consists in shedding light on this “essential 
alien,” which Žižek also calls an “inhuman core of the human.”30 This is a very inter-
esting expression, in which negativity is so clearly exposed. The ‘inhuman’ is not 
simply the opposite of the ‘human’: these two terms are asymmetrical and, from mere 
opposition, they leap into true dialectical contradiction. The ‘in’ of the ‘inhuman’ has 
two meanings: it points at that which is not (human) and at the same time at that which 
is inside (human). The inhuman is thus a human with an alien within, an essential alien 
as it were, or, in other words, what is in (within) human, its inner self, is an other, an 
alien. “I is an other” (“Je est un autre”), repeats Lacan after Rimbaud.31  
On the semantic level, an interesting parallel can be drawn between the inhuman, 
the unhuman, and the German Unmensch. As emphasized by Jean-Claude Milner, in 
the German language,  
the prefix un- is not always as flatly negative as the Latin prefix in- […]. Thus, 
Unmensch is not a nonhuman but an undone man, a monster; Unkraut is not a herb 
(kraut), but a weed, a parasite; the unheimlich is not the inverse of the familiar, 
but the familiar parasitized by an anxiety that disperses it. […] In a similar manner 
in psychoanalysis, the unconscious perpetually parasitizes consciousness, thereby 
manifesting how consciousness can be other than it is, yet not without a cost: it 
establishes precisely how it cannot be other. The negative prefix is nothing more 
than the seal of this parasitism.32 
I must add one more word to this list — Untier, which, again, means not a non-animal, 
but a kind of monster. Isn’t unconscious a territory, where Unmensch meets Untier? 
That is, a territory of the animal as such, which digs in or attaches to really-existing 
animals like a parasite?  
With the non-human, the situation looks slightly different. By talking, for instance, 
about non-human subjects, non-human animals, non-human primates, etc., we are 
seemingly getting rid of the ambiguity of an animal as such, or a human beast. It must 
be noticed that the non-human is a negative multiplicity, a negative set, which includes 
itself — the barber’s paradox doesn’t apply to it. Each and every non-human being 
never shaves (since only humans shave), and that which contains all the non-humans, 
the non-humanity, is indeed itself non-human. It is not a positivity of ‘the animal’ 
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(which was a subject of Derridean deconstruction), but a negativity of the ‘non-human’ 
that provides a non-paradoxical existence to all members of this multiplicity. The hu-
man apparently stays outside of it, almost like a barber kicked out of the city of bearded 
men who didn’t want to be shaved. However, as soon as he is kicked out, he immedi-
ately comes back — precisely in this inverted form.  
Here, we are dealing with yet another kind of negation, perfectly described by Freud. 
“You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother,” says a patient. To 
this, Freud adds: “So it is his mother.”33 There are things which can come to the light 
of consciousness only in negative forms:  
Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, 
on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is 
repressed […]. The outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the re-
pressed, while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists.34 
In such cases, ‘no’ is just “a hallmark of repression, a certificate of origin — like, let’s 
say, ‘Made in Germany’.”35 As Mladen Dolar comments, “the dream knows no ‘no,’ 
there is no ‘no’ in its vocabulary.”36 In the dream-like language of the unconscious, 
‘no’ simply means ‘yes.’  
In this sense, the insistence of the ‘non’ in the non-human can be interpreted as the 
persistence of the human that paradoxically paves its way through this self-obliteration. 
Just as the ‘un’ of the Unmensch is a hallmark of a parasitic monstrosity of an animal 
as such as an alien within a human subject, the ‘non’ of the non-human would be a 
hallmark of repression, a certificate of origin, of the human’s birth out of its own nega-
tion. Human and non-human revolve around each other and return to each other as 
repressed. What makes this possible is the fact that not only is everything different from 
the human being except for the human being itself, but, furthermore, that even a human 
being itself is different from itself; it is an other. It never coincides with itself. It, too, 
is non-human (and even a non-human as such). If psychoanalysis deals with the inhu-
man core of the human, then in non-human as such there is a human core, which oper-
ates through negation, through ‘everything but.’ The non-human dream is populated by 
monsters — human-elephants, human-clouds, human-stones, human-zombies, and hu-
man-stars. 
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